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TRUST THE PROCESS?  THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA’S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT SENT
SHOCKWAVES THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH IN
PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
FOUNDATION V. COMMONWEALTH
I. AN ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION HAS EMERGED
In the early 1900s, Pennsylvania’s natural resources were di-
minished as a result of the lumber industry cutting down trees, un-
regulated hunting that led to wildlife disappearance, and the coal
industry causing long-lasting devastation on the environment.1  In
response, the Pennsylvania legislature acknowledged these shocks
to the environment and enacted several statutes to enforce the citi-
zens’ rights to preserve the environment.2  As a result of the stat-
utes’ enactment, the government strictly regulated conventional oil
and gas drilling in Pennsylvania.3  The government, however, did
not design the regulations and statutes to address unconventional
gas development.4  The most common type of unconventional gas
development is the extraction of natural gas from the Marcellus
Shale Formation.5  Recently, new technologies for unconventional
1. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 917 (Pa.
2017) (summarizing environmental devastation from lumber, hunting, and coal
industries).
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (articulating citizens’ rights to preserve public natu-
ral resources); see also PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 918 (noting environmental devastation
was prominent reason for drafters to create ERA).  The drafters of the ERA stated
“[w]e seared and scarred our once green and pleasant land with mining opera-
tions. We polluted our rivers and our streams with acid mine drainage . . . . We cut
down our trees and erected eyesores along our roads . . . . We uglified our land
and we called it progress.” Id.  The ERA was unanimously enacted in 1971. Id.
3. See John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust,
45 ENVTL. L. 463, 478 (2015) (referencing enactment of Pennsylvania’s 1969 Oil
and Gas Act).  Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act was one of the country’s first oil and
gas laws. Id.
4. See John C. Dernbach, James R. May & Kenneth T. Kristl, Robinson Township
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examination and Implications, SSRN, Mar. 23, 2014,
at 1171-72, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412657.
&download=yes (noting previous legislation did not contemplate unconventional
gas development).  In 2012, the Oil and Gas Act was amended to incorporate un-
conventional gas development and is currently known as “Act 13.” Id. at 1172.  Act
13 addresses unconventional gas development and imposes new permit require-
ments for oil and gas procedures. Id.
5. See id. at 1171 (describing popular type of unconventional gas
development).
(229)
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gas extraction in the Marcellus Shale have emerged in
Pennsylvania.6
The Marcellus Shale Formation is a large sedimentary rock be-
neath Pennsylvania that is estimated to contain ten percent of
North America’s natural gas.7  The natural gas forms in “pockets”
within the rock formation’s fissures and cracks, which drillers then
extract.8  New techniques for drilling in the Marcellus Shale have
allowed drillers to access and recover the natural gas in enormous
quantities.9  As a result, Pennsylvania is now one of the United
States’ preeminent natural gas suppliers.10
The discovery of and extraction from the Marcellus Shale For-
mation, however, has led to a rise in lease sales to capture the natu-
ral gas from the formation, and has been the subject of citizens’
environmental concerns.11  Drillers extracting gas from the
Marcellus Shale have been shown to affect land, water, and air.12
For example, drilling on forestlands requires a large number of
trees to be cut down to build roads for the drilling equipment.13  In
addition, large amounts of water are taken from rivers and lakes
and then flushed into the rock formation to create cracks in the
rock for gas extraction.14  Once the water is flushed into the rock
formation, however, it becomes contaminated and cannot be re-
6. See generally id. (discussing discovery of new techniques for drilling in
Marcellus Shale that led to enormous amounts of state land leases for gas
extraction).
7. Id. (summarizing basic facts of Marcellus Shale Formation).  The Marcellus
Shale Formation lies beneath Pennsylvania and surrounding states. Id.
8. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 914 (Pa. 2013) (describ-
ing how gas is formed in Marcellus Shale).
9. See Dernbach, May & Kristl, supra note 4, at 1171 (describing various tech-
niques to extract natural gas from Marcellus Shale).  One technique includes drill-
ing vertically and then horizontally into the shale. Id.  Another technique is called
“hydrofracturing,” which involves injecting large amounts of water into the rock
formation to capture the gas. Id.  The various techniques used to extract natural
gas from the Marcellus Shale can produce “millions of cubic feet of gas per day.”
Id.
10. See Gabriella T. Soreth, Cracks’ in the Courts Analysis? Court Strikes Balancing
Act Between Citizens’ Constitutional Rights and Government’s Exploitation of Natural Gas
Reserves in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 27 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 329, 329 (2016) (noting Pennsylvania’s contribution to country’s gas
supply).
11. See Dernbach, May & Kristl, supra note 4, at 1171 (explaining effects of
extracting gas from Marcellus Shale Formation).
12. Environmental Impact, SHALE STUFF, http://shalestuff.com/education/en
vironment/environmental-impact (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (discussing effects of
drilling in Marcellus Shale).
13. Id. (describing how gas extraction affects lands).
14. Id. (noting that large amounts of water are taken from various bodies of
water such as rivers, “municipal water, and recycled fracking water.”).
2
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss2/3
2018] TRUST THE PROCESS? 231
turned into bodies of water.15  Lastly, drilling in the Marcellus Shale
causes greenhouse gases to be released into the air and negatively
impacts air quality.16
Despite the known environmental effects that coincide with ex-
tracting gas from the Marcellus Shale, private parties continue to
push for access to the land with natural gas trapped beneath it.17  In
2008, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania began leasing state lands
for natural gas extraction.18  The lease sales generated enormous
amounts of revenue for the Commonwealth and led to pressure on
the Commonwealth to continue leasing state land.19  The Com-
monwealth fluctuated between permitting and prohibiting the
lease sales because of the potential environmental harms that exces-
sive amounts of drilling can cause to the land.20  As a result of the
ongoing lease sales, the government took several budgetary actions,
which resulted in the environmental and constitutional dispute
in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth
(PEDF III).21,22
This Note examines the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s de-
cision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Com-
monwealth (PEDF III), which held various budgetary actions
unconstitutional.23  In PEDF III, the court overturned a test that was
used for over four decades to analyze challenges under Article I,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, also known as the Envi-
15. Id. (describing how drilling in Marcellus Shale affects water).
16. Id. (describing how gas extraction in Marcellus Shale affects air quality
depending on drilling stage).
17. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF II), 108 A.3d 140, 142 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (noting increase in demand for gas reserves were due to new
technologies for gas extraction).
18. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 920
(Pa. 2017) (explaining government agency first approved lease sale for seventy-
four thousand acres so drillers can extract gas from underneath land).
19. See PEDF II, 108 A.3d at 144 (detailing first lease sale generated $163 mil-
lion and Commonwealth pushed for additional lease sales to make up for budget-
ary shortfalls).
20. See Soreth, supra note 10, at 330 (explaining government agency’s uncer-
tainty about allowing additional lease sales).  The government agency became con-
cerned about the excessive amounts of drilling that would take place over the next
five decades. Id. at 330 n.9.
21. 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) (creating new standard for interpreting chal-
lenges under ERA).
22. For a thorough discussion of the factual summary in PEDF III, see infra
notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
23. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 911 (stating Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
holding).
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ronmental Rights Amendment (ERA).24  In doing so, the court
drilled in place that a strict reading of the ERA’s text is the proper
standard of review for environmental challenges.25  In addition, the
court declared the Commonwealth to be the trustee of Penn-
sylvania’s natural resources and unprecedentedly applied private
trust principles to the Commonwealth’s duties.26
This Note also discusses the potential ramifications that the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision could have on the environ-
ment and Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence involving citizens’ rights
under the ERA.27  Part II of this Note discusses PEDF III’s factual
summary, its primary issues, and the court’s holdings.28  Part III
provides the legal background of the ERA’s history that influenced
the court’s decision in PEDF III.29  Part IV reviews the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania’s legal analysis of the ERA’s text and inter-
pretation of Pennsylvania private trust law.30  Part V critiques the
court’s analysis, focusing on the court’s failure to address the new
standard’s applicability to circumstances outside of PEDF III and the
court’s error in imposing private trust principles.31  Lastly, Part VI
explores the potential impact the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
decision could have on future environmental jurisprudence, the
Commonwealth’s ability to act as a trustee, and land development
within Pennsylvania.32
24. See id. at 930 (providing legal analysis to overturn previously used test).
For over four decades, Pennsylvania evaluated environmental challenges with a test
created in Payne v. Kassab (Payne I), 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 361
A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). Id.  For further discussion of court’s reasoning to overturn
the Payne test, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
25. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 930 (explaining proper standard of review lies
within ERA’s text and private trust principles).
26. See id. at 932-33 (describing duties ERA imposes on Commonwealth as
trustee of public natural resources).
27. For a prediction of the PEDF III decision’s effects on future environmental
claims, see infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
28. For further discussion of PEDF III’s factual background, see infra notes 33-
54 and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of the relevant legal background regarding Penn-
sylvania’s environmental jurisprudence and prominent cases, see infra notes 54-122
and accompanying text.
30. For further discussion of the court’s legal analysis of the issues presented
in PEDF III, see infra notes 123-152 and accompanying text.
31. For a critique of the court’s analysis and findings, see infra notes 166-198
and accompanying text.
32. For an analysis of the potential impact of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania’s holding in PEDF III, see infra notes 199-216 and accompanying text.
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II. PENNSYLVANIA’S PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST FALL INTO
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S ARMS IN PEDF III
In 2008, the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources (DCNR) began leasing state land for natural gas
extraction.33  After the DCNR’s lease sale in 2008, the DCNR re-
frained from leasing additional state land because of its concerns
about large amounts of gas extraction taking place on Penn-
sylvania’s land within the upcoming decades.34  The DCNR, how-
ever, received significant pressure from the state to lease more land
because the lease sales generated enormous amounts of revenue,
which were used to help soften Pennsylvania’s budgetary
shortfalls.35
In an effort to offset Pennsylvania’s budgetary shortfalls, Gover-
nor Rendell amended the State Fiscal Code in 2009.36  In 2010,
Governor Rendell signed Executive Order No. 2010-05, which en-
forced a suspension on further leasing because of the potential
harm it would cause to Pennsylvania’s natural resources.37  Within
33. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF II), 108 A.3d 140, 143 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (explaining state land leasing for natural gas extraction became
popular due to development of new extraction technology).  In 2008, the DCNR
leased seventy-four thousand acres, which generated about $163 million in reve-
nue. Id. at 143-44. The DCNR’s leasing activities became a primary interest for the
Commonwealth because the 2008 lease sale “generated more revenue than the
prior sixty years of leasing activity combined.” Id.
34. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 921 (providing context for DCNR’s refusal to
lease additional land for natural gas extraction).  The DCNR did not want to enter
into further leases because they had previously leased about 540,000 acres that
already had extraction activity being performed on it. Id.  The DCNR felt strongly
that until they could further monitor the activity, they “believed there should be
no further leasing because we were going to be watching a tremendous amount of
gas activity on the state forest for the next [fifty] years.” Id.
35. See id. (describing need for DCNR to continue lease sales).  For further
discussion of revenues generated from state land leases, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
36. See PEDF II, 108 A.3d at 145 (detailing Govern Rendell unilaterally
amended Fiscal Code to add new Article XVI-E to govern oil and gas wells).
Within Article XVI-E, Section 1602-E required that “no money in the fund from
royalties may be expended unless appropriated by the General Assembly.”  72
P.S.C.A. § 1602-E (West 2017), invalidated by Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Common-
wealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).  Section 1603-E only allows the DCNR
“up to $50,000,000” to perform its duties under the Lease Fund Act.  72 P.S.C.A.
§ 1603-E (West 2017), invalidated by Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth
(PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
37. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF I), No. 228 M.D.2012,
2013 WL 3942086, at *4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (warning substantial amounts of
natural gas extraction would have negative effects on environment and Penn-
sylvania’s natural resources).  Governor Rendell also signed the executive order
because he feared that additional land leasing would “jeopardize DCNR’s ability to
fulfill its duty to conserve and maintain” Pennsylvania’s natural resources. PEDF
III, 161 A.3d at 923.
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the following years, the government drafted more legislative enact-
ments and made amendments to the Fiscal Code in order to con-
tinue to divert funds from the Lease Fund to the General Fund in
Fiscal Years 2010-2011 through 2014-2015.38  In 2014, Governor
Corbett’s Executive Order No. 2014-03 lifted Governor Rendell’s
sweeping moratorium on leasing state lands and only prohibited
leases that would diminish the surface areas of state forests or
parks.39
On March 19, 2012, the Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation (PEDF) filed suit against the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, alleging that the 2009-2015 budgetary decisions violated
the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA).40  PEDF alleged that
the legislative enactments violated the ERA because the enactments
diverted funds from the Lease Fund to the General Fund and com-
promised the DCNR’s ability to preserve Pennsylvania’s public natu-
ral resources.41  Further, PEDF argued that the Commonwealth did
not properly evaluate the negative impact the granting of addi-
tional leases would have on Pennsylvania’s land and public natural
resources.42  Finally, PEDF asserted that the DCNR could not fulfill
their obligations to conserve the environment because the budget-
ary enactments depleted DCNR’s funding.43  In the initial suit, the
Commonwealth Court analyzed PEDF’s claims under a test that was
38. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 921-24 (summarizing details of enacted appropri-
ations for Fiscal Years, yearly changes to General Appropriations Act, passing of
Act 13, and amendments to Fiscal Code).  An example of an enacted appropria-
tion was the General Assembly requiring $180 million to be appropriated from the
Lease Fund to the General Fund in Fiscal Year 2010-2011.  Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v.
Commonwealth (PEDF II), 108 A.3d 140, 147 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
39. See PEDF II, 108 A.3d at 150 (detailing further state land leasing for re-
source development was allowed except in narrow circumstances).
40. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 925
(Pa. 2017) (describing grounds for PEDF’s claim against Commonwealth and Gov-
ernor Corbett).  The PEDF is a non-profit organization whose objective is to pro-
tect and conserve Pennsylvania’s public natural resources. See Pa. Envtl. Def.
Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF I), No. 228 M.D.2012, 2013 WL 3942086, at *1
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (explaining purpose of PEDF).  The PEDF challenged the
2009-2015 budget decisions because the decisions led to large portions of state
lands being leased for resource extraction. PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 925 (noting
PEDF’s reason for challenging recent budgetary actions).
41. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 927 (alleging Commonwealth disregarded ERA
in deciding to appropriate funds from Lease Fund to General Fund and leasing
additional state lands for revenue).
42. Id. at 927-28 (describing PEDF’s allegations that Commonwealth violated
ERA).
43. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF I), No. 228 M.D.2012,
2013 WL 3942086, at *9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (detailing PEDF’s arguments in
seeking declaratory relief).
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created in Payne v. Kassab.44  The court used the Payne test and
found that it could not definitively say that PEDF failed to state a
claim under the ERA.45  The court, therefore, overruled the Com-
monwealth’s demurrer and preliminary objections.46
In 2015, upon the Commonwealth’s appeal, the Common-
wealth Court analyzed three issues: (1) whether Sections 1602-E
and 1603-E violated the ERA; (2) whether the appropriations from
the Lease Fund to the General Fund violated the ERA; and (3) who
has the authority to lease state lands for resource extraction.47  The
court did not apply the three-part Payne test and instead, looked to
the Robinson Township v. Commonwealth48 plurality opinion for gui-
dance in interpreting the ERA.49  After analyzing the issues, the
court granted partial summary judgment for the Commonwealth.50
The Commonwealth Court held: (1) the statutes authorizing the
appropriation of money from the Lease Fund to the General Fund
did not violate the ERA; (2) there was no evidence that DCNR’s
funding was inadequate; (3) the lease sale revenues were not re-
quired to be used solely for conservation purposes; and (4) the
Lease Fund is a special fund, not a trust fund.51
In 2017, upon PEDF’s appeal, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and set forth
a broad interpretation of the ERA by imposing private trust law
44. Payne v. Kassab (Payne I), 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d,
361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) (laying out Payne test for challenges under ERA); see also
PEDF I, 2013 WL 3942086, at *9-10 (discussing application of Payne test to PEDF’s
facts). For further discussion of the Payne test’s elements, see infra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
45. PEDF I, 2013 WL 3942086, at *10 (finding it was too early to make deter-
mination on PEDF’s claims under Payne test).
46. See id. at *10-13 (detailing preliminary objections that challenged legal
sufficiency of complaint and alleged that PEDF’s claims raised non-justiciable polit-
ical questions).
47. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF II), 108 A.3d 140, 155
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (providing list of issues for judicial review and setting up
court’s analysis).
48. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (holding ERA’s text is proper standard of review
for environmental challenges).
49. See PEDF II, 108 A.3d at 156-59 (describing how court adopted Robinson
Township approach of looking at ERA’s plain language).  The court found the
Payne test to be binding, but only applicable to a narrow set of cases. Id. at 159.  For
further discussion of the three-part Payne test, see infra notes 87-88 and accompa-
nying text.  For further discussion of the Robinson Township plurality decision, see
infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
50. See PEDF II, 108 A.3d at 173 (stating Commonwealth was granted relief on
two constitutional challenges).
51. See id. at 140 (listing court’s holding).  The court also determined that
leasing decisions are exclusively under DCNR’s authority. Id. at 172.
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principles.52  In doing so, the court overturned the Payne test and
found that a strict reading of the ERA’s text is the proper standard
of review for environmental challenges.53  The court had three
main findings: (1) laws that impair citizens’ environmental rights
are unconstitutional; (2) lease sale revenues are part of the “corpus
of the trust,” which is a sum of money used for the beneficiaries,
and must be used only for conservation purposes; and (3) the ERA
is self-executing, meaning a party does not need a separate legisla-
tive act to bring a claim under the ERA.54
III. FORMING THE FOUNDATION OF TRUST
A. Protecting Pennsylvania’s Public Natural Resources
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has a long history of leas-
ing state lands for oil and gas extraction.55  In the midst of Penn-
sylvania allowing for significant oil and gas extraction, the
Commonwealth attempted to protect the Pennsylvania’s natural re-
sources by creating a variety of legislation, including: acts, forma-
tion of agencies, constitutional amendments, and executive
orders.56  The Commonwealth enacted the Oil and Gas Lease Fund
Act (Lease Fund Act) in 1955 to govern rent and royalty collection
from the Commonwealth’s oil and gas leases.57  The Act also re-
quired that the monies collected be deposited into the Oil and Gas
Lease Fund (Lease Fund).58
52. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 930-
32 (Pa. 2017) (detailing Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s interpretation of ERA);
see generally Susan Phillips, Pa. Supreme Court Upholds Broad Interpretation of Environ-
mental Rights Amendment, ST. IMPACT (June 20, 2017, 7:33 PM), https://
stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2017/06/20/pa-supreme-court-upholds-broad-
interpretation-of-environmental-rights-amendment/ (describing significance of
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision).
53. Phillips, supra note 52 (noting court’s broad analysis of ERA compared to
previous precedent).
54. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 911 (listing Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
holdings).
55. Id. at 919 (describing state land leasing for resource extraction is common
in Pennsylvania).  The DCNR has been leasing state land since 1947.  Pa. Envtl.
Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF II), 108 A.3d 140, 143 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2015).
56. Soreth, supra note 10, at 335 (explaining Pennsylvania’s attempts to pre-
serve and maintain public natural resources).
57. 71 P.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1333 (West 2017) (repealed 2017) (noting purpose of
Lease Fund Act); see also PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 919-20 (detailing enactment of Lease
Fund Act).
58. PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 919-20 (describing what Lease Fund governs).  The
Lease Fund is to be “used for conservation, recreation, dams, or flood control or to
match any Federal grants which may be made for any of the aforementioned pur-
poses.”  71 P.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2017) (repealed 2017).
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In 1995, the Commonwealth also enacted the Conservation
and Natural Resources Act (CNRA) to protect Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources.59  The CNRA created the DCNR as a “cabinet-
level advocate” to protect state lands and uphold the Act’s mis-
sion.60  The CNRA also granted the DCNR sole discretion to enter
into contracts regarding natural resource extraction as long as the
DCNR believed it would be in the Commonwealth’s best interest.61
In the past decade, the DCNR had increased the number of
state land leases due to the creation and implementation of en-
hanced technology available to extract natural gas from the
Marcellus Shale.62  The Marcellus Shale revolution prompted Gov-
ernor Corbett to enact Act 13, which regulated natural gas develop-
ment and prevented local governments from regulating resource
extraction.63  The DCNR’s significant increase in state land lease
sales for natural gas extraction, due to extraction-friendly legisla-
tion, has led to large amounts of revenue for Pennsylvania.64
B. ERA’s Enactment to the Pennsylvania Constitution
In the 1950s and 60s, Pennsylvania endured a period of envi-
ronmental devastation from the lumber, hunting, and coal indus-
59. 71 P.S.C.A. §§ 1340.101-1340.103 (West 2017) (noting purpose of CNRA);
see also PEDF II, 108 A.3d at 142 (explaining CNRA was enacted to protect natural
resources).
60. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 920-21 (describing DCNR’s role in protecting
environment).  The DCNR’s primary mission is to “maintain, improve and pre-
serve State parks, to manage State forest lands to assure their long-term health,
sustainability and economic use, to provide information on Pennsylvania’s ecologi-
cal and geologic resources and to administer grant and technical assistance pro-
grams . . . .”  71 P.S.C.A. §§ 1340.101 (West 2017).
61. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 920 (detailing DCNR is granted sole authority to
lease state lands for natural resource extraction).
62. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF II), 108 A.3d 140, 142
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (describing increase in state land leasing due to new tech-
nology for extracting natural gas from Marcellus Shale).  The Marcellus Shale is a
sedimentary rock buried underneath the earth’s surface that contains gas “pock-
ets” within the rock formation that the drillers perforate to extract natural gas. See
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 914 (Pa. 2013) (describing
Marcellus Shale Formation and extraction process); see also Environmental Impact,
SHALE STUFF, http://shalestuff.com/education/environment/environmental-im
pact (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) (describing impact gas extraction from Marcellus
Shale has on forestlands, water, and air quality).
63. For further discussion of Act 13, see infra note 109 and accompanying
text.
64. For further discussion of the large amount of revenue generated in Penn-
sylvania from leasing state lands for natural gas extraction, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
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tries.65  As a result of the devastating environmental impact,
Pennsylvania’s General Assembly unanimously enacted the ERA to
the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1971.66  The General Assembly de-
signed the ERA to attempt to prevent further pollution, destruc-
tion, and misuse of Pennsylvania’s natural resources.67  The ERA,
Article 1, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and es-
thetic values of the environment.  Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the peo-
ple, including generations yet to come.  As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and main-
tain them for the benefit of all the people.68
The ERA’s first and second clauses established two separate
rights for the Commonwealth’s citizens: (1) the right to “clean air,
pure water,” and environmental preservation; and (2) common
ownership of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.69  The third
clause of the ERA established the Commonwealth’s role as the trus-
tee of public natural resources and named the citizens as the
“beneficiaries.”70
Typically, challenges brought under the ERA proceeded under
three theories: either the government had violated the citizens’
rights, the government failed to perform its trustee duties, or the
65. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 960-61 (explaining three environmental
events that led to ERA’s enactment).  The first environmental event was the boom
in the lumber harvesting industry that resulted in large portions of Pennsylvania
becoming barren. Id. at 960.  Second, unregulated hunting, deforestation, and pol-
lution led to the “game” wildlife disappearing and through various efforts, the
Pennsylvania Game Commission sought to restore the wildlife populations. Id.
Third, the lack of restrictions on the coal industry resulted in long-lasting effects
on human health and devastation to the environment. Id. at 960-61.
66. Id. (summarizing ERA’s purpose was to affirm citizens’ environmental
rights and preserve Pennsylvania’s public natural resources).
67. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 940
(Pa. 2017) (discussing ERA centered on protecting Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources).
68. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating first paragraph of Article I, Section 27 of
Pennsylvania Constitution that is also known as ERA).
69. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951-54 (discussing citizens’ environmental
rights and Commonwealth’s inability to act contrary to citizens’ environmental
rights).
70. Id. at 955-56 (interpreting ERA’s trust provisions).  The Court explained
that although the Commonwealth is the trustee, other branches of Pennsylvania’s
government also have authority over the natural resources. Id. at 956.  This allows
for checks and balances on the branches to work for the benefit of the people. Id.
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government’s action can ran afoul to both theories.71  When faced
with challenges brought under the ERA, courts consistently have
not categorized whether the alleged action violated the peoples’
rights under the ERA’s first, second, or third clause.72  Neverthe-
less, the ERA has been “the law of the land in Pennsylvania” for
decades.73
C. ERA Lost Its Original Intention
Shortly after Pennsylvania adopted the ERA, its original mean-
ing was quickly lost in two cases, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower, Inc.74  and Payne v. Kassab, decided by Pennsylvania
courts in 1973.75  In National Gettysburg, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania handed down a controversial decision that impinged
upon citizens’ environmental rights under the ERA.76  The Com-
monwealth sought to enjoin construction of a 307-foot observation
tower near the Gettysburg Battlefield because the tower would ruin
the historic environment, block the skyline, and “erode the natural
beauty and setting which once was marked by the awful conflict of a
brothers’ war.”77  Since the local governments did not have regula-
tions to govern the construction of towers, the Commonwealth
could only seek relief under the ERA.78  A divided court affirmed
71. Id. at 950-51 (addressing three theories that plaintiffs use to bring claims
under ERA).
72. Id. at 964 (noting previous courts’ lack of distinction between ERA’s
clauses when evaluating challenges). The courts’ lack of distinction between which
ERA clause was implicated created confusion for future courts and interfered with
having consistent court rulings. Id.
73. Robert B. McKinstry & Harry Weiss, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Extends Its
Landmark Robinson Township Decision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Founda-
tion v. Commonwealth, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP (July 11, 2017), http://www.ballard
spahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2017-07-11-pa-supreme-court-extends-
landmark-robinson-twp-decision-in-pedf-v-commonwealth.aspx (noting ERA’s sig-
nificance in Pennsylvania environmental law).
74. 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) (discussing plurality’s holding that ERA is not
self-executing and plaintiff needs legislation to bring action under ERA).
75. John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights
for Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 339
(2015) (explaining previous precedents disregarded ERA’s original meaning).
76. See Soreth, supra note 10, at 338 (discussing controversy arising out of
court’s ruling that ERA is not self-executing).
77. Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 589-
90 (Pa. 1973) (explaining state’s claim focused on enforcing citizens’ rights under
ERA’s first clause).  The Commonwealth argued that the citizens have the ability to
limit private development by enforcing their environmental rights. See Dernbach
& Prokopchak, supra note 75, at 340 (summarizing one of Commonwealth’s argu-
ments against construction of tower on private land).
78. Nat’l Gettysburg, 311 A.2d at 590 (detailing Commonwealth could only
challenge tower construction under ERA).
11
Cabrera: Trust the Process? The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's Broad Inte
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
240 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX: p. 229
the lower court’s decision to deny the injunction, but remained di-
vided as to whether the ERA is self-executing.79  The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania failed to reach a majority opinion, and this
decision left future courts grappling with how to determine the
proper analysis for challenges under the ERA.80
Within the same year, the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
sylvania decided Payne, which rendered guidance for courts to de-
termine the proper standard of review for challenges under the
ERA.81  The citizens of Wilkes-Barre brought an action to enjoin
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation from widening
River Street and taking roughly one-half acre of a public park, River
Common, in the City of Wilkes-Barre.82  In part, the citizens argued
that the Commonwealth’s approval of the street widening project
violated the ERA by disregarding the Commonwealth’s obligations
as the trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.83  The
Commonwealth Court denied the citizens’ relief and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the citizens failed to
establish their burden of proof.84  The court asserted that the Com-
79. Id. at 592-95 (summarizing division between Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania’s justices).  Three justices found the ERA to not be self-executing, and
therefore, the Commonwealth could not bring a claim without legislation allowing
it.  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 964 (Pa. 2013).  One justice
concurred with no specific opinion. Id.  Two justices would have affirmed the
lower court’s decision that the Commonwealth failed to establish their burden of
proof. Id.  Lastly, two justices would have reversed the lower court’s decision and
believed that the ERA was self-executing. Id.
80. See Meghan A. Farley, Did the Court Dig Too Deep?’: An Analysis of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court’s Decision in Robinson Twp., Washington County v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 26 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 325, 333 (2015) (explaining
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania failed to develop rule for applying ERA).  The
Commonwealth Court’s decision, finding that the ERA is self-executing, is still
binding authority. See Soreth, supra note 10, at 339 (recognizing lower court’s de-
cision of ERA being self-executing is binding on future courts).
81. See Farley, supra note 80, at 334 (explaining Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania crafted test for future courts in analyzing challenges under ERA).
82. See Payne v. Kassab (Payne I), 312 A.2d 86, 88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973),
aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) (explaining construction details for street widening
project).  The Wilkes-Barre citizens argued that the street widening project would
take about twelve feet of land from River Common, remove large trees, and dimin-
ish a pedestrian walkway. Id.
83. Payne v. Kassab (Payne II), 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976) (detailing part of
citizens’ arguments against Commonwealth).  The citizens also argued that the
Commonwealth violated its obligations under Act 120, which requires the Com-
monwealth, before approving the project, to determine that the proposed project
was the best option and the project is designed to minimize environmental harm.
Id. at 269.
84. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 965 (Pa. 2013) (sum-
marizing Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Payne).  The court found the
citizens’ argument to be flawed because they sought “automatic relief by merely
12
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monwealth’s obligation as the trustee for public natural resources
was not only to preserve the resources, but also to maintain a suita-
ble highway that is beneficial to citizens.85
The most cited, and now widely criticized, portion of the Payne
opinion was the Commonwealth Court’s creation of the three-part
balancing test used to clarify the citizens’ burden of proof under
the ERA.86  The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found the
correct approach for analyzing challenges under the ERA was to
balance the interests between environmental and social concerns,
instead of looking directly to the ERA’s text.87  For a party to obtain
relief under the ERA, the court considered three factors: (1) com-
pliance with laws that functioned to protect Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources; (2) evidence to show that reasonable efforts were
used to decrease negative environmental effects; and (3) a balance
between environmental harm and portrayed benefits from the chal-
lenged action.88  The three-part Payne test became the “all-purpose
test” for analyzing challenges that arose under the ERA.89  The ef-
fects of the Payne test, however, were detrimental to citizens’ rights
claims.90  The plaintiffs typically lost when they sought to protect
their environmental rights, due to the Payne test’s focus on the suc-
cess of a local government decision rather than public rights.91
Over forty years later, Pennsylvania courts changed the legal land-
scape for plaintiffs by upholding plaintiffs’ environmental rights in
asserting a common right to a protected value under the trusteeship of the state.”
Id.
85. See Payne II, 361 A.2d at 273 (explaining public trust doctrine allows for
maintenance and expansion of highway systems).
86. See Farley, supra note 80, at 334 (introducing three-part test established in
Payne).
87. See Payne v. Kassab (Payne I), 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973),
aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) (summarizing balancing analysis for Payne’s three-
part test).  The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania further noted that the bal-
ancing interests “must be realistic and not merely legalistic.” Id.
88. See id. (describing Payne three-part balancing test).
89. See Dernbach, supra note 3, at 476-77 (explaining Payne test had become
standard test for future courts even though test is not based on public rights).
Critics have observed that the Payne test does not function like a public trust doc-
trine but instead, is just “an administrative law test for determining the efficacy of
an administrative agency or local government decision.” Id. at 477.
90. Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 75, at 344 (noting plaintiffs lost
“overwhelming majority” of environmental rights cases).
91. See id. (summarizing results of Payne test for plaintiffs); see also Dernbach,
supra note 3, at 477 (discussing effects of Payne test’s improper standard).
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recent cases such as Center for Coalfield Justice and Sierra Club v.
DEP.92,93
D. This Case was a Real Payne: Challenges Presented by the
Payne Test
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Con-
cerned Citizens for Orderly Progress v. Commonwealth, Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources94 is an example of the difficulties associated with
applying the Payne test.95  In Concerned Citizens, a citizens’ organiza-
tion challenged the Department of Environmental Resources’
(DER) authorization for the installation of a new sewer system.96
The citizens’ group argued that the DER and Environmental Hear-
ing Board (EHB) violated the ERA because neither properly as-
sessed the environmental harm the proposed project would cause
before approving the permit.97  Although the court acknowledged
that the DER and EHB did not balance the benefits and harms of
the proposed project under the Payne test, it nevertheless found in
favor of the Commonwealth.98  In ruling for the Commonwealth,
the court applied its own Payne analysis and concluded that the issu-
ance of the permit did not violate the ERA because the benefits of
the sewer system outweighed the environmental impact.99
92. See Nos. 2014-072-B, 2014-083-B, 2015-051-B, 2017 WL 3842580, at *37
(Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Aug. 15, 2017) (upholding plaintiff’s environmental rights
under new standard of review created in PEDF III).
93. For further discussion of Center for Coalfield Justice, see infra note 201 and
accompanying text. See also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III),
161 A.3d 911, 911 (Pa. 2017); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 901
(Pa. 2013) (ruling in favor of plaintiffs who challenged government actions).
94. 387 A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (ruling in favor of government’s
action for new sewer system).
95. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 75, at 345-46 (providing prece-
dent to illustrate hardship created by Payne test).
96. See id. at 345 (describing citizens’ opposition to DER’s approval of water
quality permit for developing new sewage system and treatment plan in trailer
park).  The permit would also allow for the sewage waste to be discarded in the
Alleghany Creek. Id.
97. See id. at 346 (explaining part of citizens’ argument against DER’s permit
approval).  The citizens’ argument is based off of the third factor in the Payne test,
which requires a balance between the benefits of the proposed project and the
environmental harm that will be caused. See Concerned Citizens for Orderly Pro-
gress v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 387 A.2d 989, 993 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1978).
98. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 75, at 346 (noting Payne test was
not followed but court ruled in favor of Commonwealth anyway).
99. See id. (describing Commonwealth Court’s creation of their own Payne
standard).
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For many years, courts evaluated environmental challenges
under the Payne test; however, the test recently came under heavy
scrutiny.100  Critics regarded the Payne test as an inappropriate stan-
dard for analyzing claims brought under the ERA because it ap-
plied only in a narrow set of circumstances.101  The Payne test was
not favorable for litigants or practitioners because they both faced
difficulties in applying the test to government actions that did not
involve public resources but still affected the environment.102  The
Payne test’s limited scope could not be properly applied to govern-
ment actions that affected the environment but did not involve
public natural resources because Payne only involved an instance
where a public resource was affected.103  Critics also believed that
the Commonwealth Court stepped outside its purview by creating
the Payne test because it was not a proper interpretation of the
ERA’s text.104  Lastly, the Payne test had also been regarded as “ill-
fitted” to the ERA’s text because it failed to consider whether the
citizens’ public rights remain protected under the ERA.105  Instead,
the Payne test only analyzed the effectiveness of a local govern-
ment’s decision.106  Thirty-seven years later, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania challenged the controversial Payne test in Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth.107
100. See Pennsylvania Supreme Court Invalidates Test for Constitutionality of Com-
monwealth Environmental Actions and Applies Private Trust Law, Leaving Many Unan-
swered Questions, FROST, TODD, BROWN, LLP (June 23, 2017), http://www.frost
browntodd.com/resources-pennsylvania-supreme-court-invalidates-test-for-constitu
tionality-of-commonwealth-environmental-actions.html (laying out challenges to
Payne test).
101. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 967 (Pa. 2013) (conclud-
ing Payne test appropriate only in “narrowest category of cases” alleging non-com-
pliance with statutory standards).
102. See Terry R. Bossert, Pa. High Court Addresses Scope of the Environmental
Rights Amendment, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 25, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://
www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202793747697/Pa-High-Court-Addresses-
Scope-of-the-Environmental-Rights-Amendment (explaining difficulties in apply-
ing Payne test because Payne only involved public resource that was affected).
103. See id. (noting Payne test did not apply if public natural resources were
not specifically implicated).
104. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 75, at 343 (criticizing Common-
wealth Court for substituting ERA’s text with three-part test).
105. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911,
930 (Pa. 2017) (stating Payne test strips ERA of its meaning); Dernbach, supra note
3, at 477 (explaining Payne test “bears virtually no relationship to” ERA’s text).
106. Dernbach, supra note 3, at 477 (detailing Payne test’s improper focus).
107. See Soreth, supra note 10, at 341 (introducing court’s Robinson Township
opinion that refused to apply Payne test).
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E. Beginning Restoration of the ERA’s Original Intention
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began to revive
the ERA’s original intent in Robinson Township when it considered
whether the Payne test was the proper standard of review for chal-
lenges under the ERA.108  The Robinson Township litigation ensued
as a result of Governor Corbett enacting Act 13 to “impose uniform
statewide land-use regulations on shale gas development” and re-
modeled the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act.109  The citizens argued
that Act 13 was unconstitutionally vague, violated the ERA, as well
as other parts of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and encroached
upon the government’s separation of powers.110  The court first ad-
dressed whether the three-part Payne test was the appropriate stan-
dard in analyzing the challenge to Act 13.111  The plurality rejected
Payne and found the test: (1) too narrowly described the Common-
wealth’s obligations under the ERA; (2) assumed that relief under
the ERA is contingent upon legislation; and (3) limited executive
agencies and the judicial branch from performing their constitu-
tional obligations.112
Instead of applying the Payne test, the plurality looked to the
ERA’s text and the drafters’ intention.113  The plurality indicated
that the first clause of the ERA established the citizens’ rights to
“clean air and pure water” and preservation of the environment.114
Next, the plurality found that the ERA’s second and third clauses
established the citizens’ ownership of Pennsylvania’s public natural
108. Steven T. Miano & Jessica R. O’Neill, Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights
Amendment Given New Life, 32 No. 1 WESTLAW J. TOXIC TORTS 12, 1 (2014) (stating
court’s decision was important victory for Robinson Township’s citizens).
109. See id. (summarizing Act 13’s purpose).  The challenged sections of Act
13 prohibited the local government to regulate resource operations and imple-
mented uniform zoning ordinances for the development of oil and gas resources.
Id.
110. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915-16 (Pa. 2013) (de-
tailing citizens’ arguments to enjoin Act 13’s implementation).
111. See id. at 965-67 (explaining plurality’s analysis in rejecting Payne test).
112. See id. at 967 (identifying three issues with applying Payne test).
113. See id. at 950-51 (describing suggested standard of review for challenges
under ERA).  The plurality also concluded that the ERA is self-executing.
Dernbach, May & Kristl, supra note 4, at 1178 (explaining court’s reason for declar-
ing ERA self-executing).  The plurality reasoned that if the ERA was not self-exe-
cuting, the government’s power would be limited because their abilities would
depend on what the legislature grants them. Id.
114. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951-52 (establishing Commonwealth’s obliga-
tion to refrain from violating citizens’ rights through legislative enactment or exec-
utive action).
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resources and invoked the public trust doctrine.115  Focusing on the
ERA’s text, the plurality noted that Act 13 eliminated the govern-
ment’s involvement in natural gas development, which allowed the
Commonwealth to ignore their duties under the ERA.116  There-
fore, the plurality declared Act 13’s sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d),
3303, and 3304 unconstitutional.117
The Robinson Township decision was significant because this was
the first time a Pennsylvania court used the ERA to declare a statute
unconstitutional.118 Commentators consider the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s opinion in Robinson Township to be the “recovery” of
the ERA’s intention because of the focus on the ERA’s plain lan-
guage.119  The opinion, however, was reached by a plurality and not
binding on future cases, which placed the ERA, litigants, and practi-
tioners “back into legal limbo.”120  Pennsylvania courts refused to
implement the Robinson Township decision and continued to apply
115. See id. at 954-56 (describing ERA’s second and third clauses).  The plural-
ity explained that the Commonwealth has two obligations under ERA: (1) refrain
from permitting the “degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural re-
sources,” and (2) use legislative action to affirmatively protect the environment. Id.
at 957-58.
116. See id. at 978 (stating reason for determining parts of Act 13 to be
unconstitutional).
117. Id. at 910 (stating plurality’s holding).  Section 3215 governs restrictions
on well locations and Section 3215(b)(4) grants waivers to avoid distance restric-
tions under certain circumstances.  58 P.S.C.A. § 3215(b)(4) (West 2017) (summa-
rizing what Section 3215 governs).  The plurality’s difficulty with Section
3215(b)(4) was that the Department of Environmental Protection’s (DEP) was
able to waive parts of driller’s well permit applications. See Farley, supra note 80, at
353 (describing difficulties associated with Section 3215(b)(4)).  Section 3215(d)
does not require the DEP to act upon submitted comments regarding determina-
tions for well permits.  58 P.S.C.A. § 3215(d) (West 2017) (summarizing what Sec-
tion 3215(d) governs).  The plurality found Section 3215(d) decreased
participation in protecting public natural resources. See Farley, supra note 80, at
354 (describing court’s findings with Section 3215(d)).  Section 3303 prevented
the local regulation of oil and gas operations and violated the ERA because “the
General Assembly has no authority to remove a political subdivision’s implicitly
necessary authority to carry out into effect its constitutional duties.”  58 P.S.C.A.
§ 3303 (West 2017); Dernbach, May & Kristl, supra note 4, at 1180 (summarizing
what Section 3303 governs).  Section 3304 requires the local ordinances to permit
reasonable environmental development of natural resources.  58 P.S.C.A. § 3304
(West 2017) (describing requirements under Section 3304).  The plurality re-
ferred to the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that Section 3304 violated the citizens’
rights by “requiring local governments to amend their existing zoning ordinances
without regard for basic zoning principles.” Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 931 (detail-
ing court’s ruling for Section 3304).
118. See Dernbach, supra note 3, at 479 (describing how Robinson Township
decision changed legal landscape for applying ERA).
119. See Soreth, supra note 10, at 343 (proclaiming Robinson Township’s posi-
tive effect on ERA’s interpretation).
120. See Margaret Anne Hill et al., ERA Revisited: Solutions for Navigating an
Uncertain Legal Landscape, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 13, 2017, 12:00 AM),
17
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the Payne test to future challenges brought under the ERA.121  The
Pennsylvania courts’ refusal to recognize the Robinson Township de-
cision prompted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to completely
overturn the Payne test and create a new standard of review in its
2017 landmark decision, Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Founda-
tion v. Commonwealth.122
IV. DIGGING INTO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S NEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Prior to PEDF III, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania lacked
the ability to solidify the proper standard of review for challenges
under the ERA.123  When PEDF III reached the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, the court analyzed the legislative challenges in accor-
dance with a strict reading of the ERA’s text and Pennsylvania pri-
vate trust law.124  The two primary issues before the court involved
the proper standard of review for challenges under the ERA and
the constitutionality of governmental budgetary actions.125
The court first analyzed the ERA and determined that the
proper standard of review lay within the ERA’s text and the underly-
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202792970565 (detailing on-going un-
certainty for examining challenges under ERA).
121. See id. (explaining subsequent courts’ refusal to apply Robinson Town-
ship’s decision to successive ERA claims).  In 2016, the Commonwealth appealed
the decision, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not evaluate the standard
of review for challenges under the ERA that the plurality applied in 2013. See
generally Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016); see also Joel R.
Burcat, We Meant What We Said: Pa. Supreme Court Issues Latest Decision in Robinson
Township, SAUL EWING LLP, http://www.saul.com/publications/alerts/we-meant-
what-we-said-pa-supreme-court-issues-latest-decision-robinson-township (last visited
Aug. 26, 2017) (noting analysis applied in 2013 Robinson Township opinion has not
been addressed or examined again).  The 2016 Robinson Township decision af-
firmed many of the plurality’s prior decision and further ruled Act 13’s Sections
3218.1, 3222.1(b)(10), 3222.1(b)(11), and 3241 to be unconstitutional. See Robin-
son Twp., 147 A.3d at 588-89 (stating Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding).
122. See Joseph Brendel, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Completes Revival of Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/pennsylvania-supreme-court-completes-85897/ (noting significance of
PEDF III’s decision in reviving ERA’s original meaning); see also Anthony R. Holtz-
man et al., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Issues Transformative Decision in Environmental
Rights Amendment Case, K&L GATES (July 11, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/penn
sylvania-supreme-court-issues-transformative-decision-in-environmental-rights-
amendment-case-07-11-2017/; Phillips, supra note 52 (describing PEDF III opinion
as “landmark decision”).
123. See Philips, supra note 52 (detailing significance of PEDF III opinion); see
also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 926 (Pa.
2017) (noting Robinson Township plurality is not binding precedent).
124. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 930 (describing analysis for PEDF’s challenges).
125. Id. at 929 (laying out two main issues court examined).
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ing principles of Pennsylvania private trust law.126  Next, the court
turned to the constitutionality of sections 1602-E and 1603-E.127
The court declared the sections to be unconstitutional because they
allowed the lease sale revenues to be used for non-trust purposes.128
Finally, Justice Baer’s dissenting opinion argued that the ERA was
silent on funding and asserted that the revenues from the lease
sales may be used for other public needs.129
A. Drilling in the Proper Standard of Review for Challenges
Under the ERA
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first analyzed whether the
three-part Payne test was the proper standard of review for chal-
lenges under the ERA.130  In doing so, the court accepted PEDF’s
argument that the issues in the present case did not fit in Payne’s
narrow category.131  Ultimately, the court overturned the Payne test
because it was not consistent with the ERA’s text or the drafters’
intention.132  Instead, the court determined that a strict reading of
the ERA’s text was the proper standard of review and recognized
the underlying principles of Pennsylvania’s private trust law when
interpreting the ERA.133
The court relied on the Robinson Township plurality opinion in
examining the proper interpretation of the ERA’s text.134  The
court recognized that the citizens had two rights under the ERA:
(1) the right to clean air and pure water, and (2) ownership of the
126. For further discussion of the proper standard of review under the ERA,
see infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
127. PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 937-39 (analyzing constitutionality of legislative
enactments).
128. For further discussion of the majority’s holding that Sections 1602-E and
1603-E are unconstitutional, see infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
129. For further discussion of Justice Baer’s dissent, see infra notes 154-165
and accompanying text.
130. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 930
(Pa. 2017) (explaining Payne test is not proper standard for challenges under
ERA).
131. Id. (identifying issues with applying Payne test).
132. Id. (summarizing court’s reason to overturn Payne test).  The court noted
that the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania regarded the Payne test as being
“ill-fitted” to the ERA’s text and created inconsistent legal rulings. Id.  The court
overturned the Payne test because it destroyed the ERA’s meaning. Id.
133. Id. (laying out court’s analysis for determining proper standard of review
under ERA).
134. Id. (noting this was not first time Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ad-
dressed citizens’ rights and Commonwealth’s obligations under ERA).  The court
referenced their Robinson Township plurality opinion in 2013 that suggested the
proper standard of review for challenges under the ERA. Id.
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natural resources.135  In addition, the court found that the third
clause of the ERA triggered application of Pennsylvania private
trust law by naming the Commonwealth as the trustee of Penn-
sylvania’s public natural resources.136  The Commonwealth, as the
trustee, had two duties under the ERA: (1) to prohibit the “degra-
dation, diminution, and depletion” of public natural resources; and
(2) to act affirmatively to conserve the environment.137
The Commonwealth argued that royalties obtained from the
lease sales do not need to be used solely for conserving public natu-
ral resources.138  The court rejected the Commonwealth’s argu-
ments and considered PEDF’s assertion that lease sale revenues are
to remain in the “corpus of trust.”139  The court reiterated that
under Pennsylvania’s private trust law, lease sale revenues are part
of the trust’s corpus and the Commonwealth must manage the
funds in accordance with the trust’s purpose.140  The court re-
135. For further discussion of the two rights granted to Commonwealth’s citi-
zens under ERA, see supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.  The court found
the first sentence of the ERA to limit the state’s power to act contrary to the citi-
zens’ rights and warned that any law that impairs the citizens’ rights would be
found unconstitutional.  Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161
A.3d 911, 931 (Pa. 2017).  The court also concluded that the term “public natural
resources,” referenced in the ERA’s second clause, includes gas extraction on state
forests and parks. Id.
136. PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 931-32 (explaining third clause of ERA invokes
private trust law).  The Commonwealth, as the trustee of Pennsylvania’s public nat-
ural resources, has a fiduciary duty to “comply with the terms of the trust” and act
towards the “corpus of the trust—the public natural resources—with prudence,
loyalty, and impartiality.” Id. (quoting Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d
901, 956-57 (Pa. 2013)) (describing Commonwealth’s fiduciary duty as trustee of
public natural resources).
137. Id. at 932-33 (summarizing Commonwealth’s duties under ERA).  The
court stated that the trustee can only use the assets of the trust to preserve public
natural resources. Id.
138. Id. at 933-34 (outlining Commonwealth’s argument against only using
lease sale revenues for trust purposes).  The Commonwealth first argued that the
ERA does not specify how lease sale revenues may be used or address funding for
conversation of natural resources. Id.  The court rejected this argument and rea-
soned that the third clause of the ERA creates a trust and the revenues from the
lease sales are part of the trust’s corpus. Id.  The revenues from the lease sales,
therefore, must remain in the trust’s corpus. Id.  Second, the Commonwealth ar-
gued the General Assembly can use the lease sale revenues for any use that benefits
the citizens, not just to conserve the public natural resources. Id. at 934.  The court
also rejected this argument because the Commonwealth’s duty is to conserve the
public natural resources; therefore, the lease sale revenues are to be used for con-
servation purposes as well. Id.
139. Id. at 935 (explaining court considered PEDF’s argument but could not
state with certainty that PEDF’s assertion was correct).
140. Id. at 935-36 (determining how lease sale revenues must be used).
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manded the case to determine the proper classification of other
types of revenue under the ERA.141
B. Identifying the ERA as Self-Executing
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania then evaluated PEDF’s ar-
gument that the ERA’s trust provisions are self-executing.142  The
court noted that the question of whether the trust provisions were
self-executing or required legislative action to be effective, would be
an issue of first impression in regard to this specific circum-
stance.143  The court referenced Payne and the Robinson Township
plurality to support its analysis.144  The court considered Payne’s
conclusion that the ERA’s trust provisions did not require legisla-
tive action to be enforced.145  Further, the court considered the
Robinson Township plurality’s finding that the citizens had a right to
seek enforcement of the Commonwealth’s duties as the trustee of
natural resources.146  As a result, the court agreed with PEDF and
concluded that the ERA’s trust provisions are self-executing.147
C. Addressing the Constitutionality of Section 1602-E and 1603-E
Following the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s finding that
lease sale revenues were trust assets and must remain in the trust’s
corpus, the court evaluated the constitutionality of Sections 1602-E
and 1603-E.148  The court explained that Sections 1602-E and 1603-
E exclusively relate to revenues and ignore the Commonwealth’s
obligation, as the trustee of public natural resources, to conserve
141. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 936
(Pa. 2017) (noting it is unclear how to categorize other revenue streams such as
up-front bonus bid payments).
142. Id. (laying out PEDF’s argument for ERA being self-executing).
143. See id. (explaining previous precedent has not addressed ERA being self-
executing in regard to enforcing citizens’ rights against private property owners).
144. Id. at 936-37 (evaluating whether ERA’s public trust provisions are self-
executing).
145. Id. at 937 (summarizing Payne II’s finding that ERA’s second and third
clauses did not need legislative action to be enforced against Commonwealth).
The court stated “[t]here can be no question that the Amendment itself declares
and creates a public trust of public natural resources . . . [and that] . . . [n]o
implementing legislation is needed to enunciate these broad purposes and estab-
lish these relationships; the [A]mendment does so by [itself].” Id. (quoting Payne
v. Kassab (Payne II), 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976)).
146. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 937
(Pa. 2017) (summarizing Robinson Township plurality’s analysis).
147. Id. (concluding ERA does not need legislative action to be effective).
148. Id. (setting foundation for court’s analysis of Sections 1602-E and
1603-E).
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the resources.149  The court reiterated that the Commonwealth may
only use trust assets for conservation purposes and must handle the
trust corpus in accordance with its trustee obligations.150  The court
reasoned that the government violated the ERA when it permitted
the diversion of funds from the Lease Fund for non-trust pur-
poses.151  The court, therefore, held Sections 1602-E and 1603-E to
be facially unconstitutional and reversed the Commonwealth
Court’s ruling with respect to these sections.152
D. Justice Baer’s Concurrence and Dissent: The Majority’s
Imposition of Private Trust Law is Improper
Justice Baer concurred with the majority’s opinion to overturn
the Payne test and declare the ERA’s trust provisions as self-execut-
ing.153  Justice Baer disagreed, however, with the majority’s holding
that Sections 1602-E and 1603-E are unconstitutional.154  Justice
Baer argued that the majority imposed “inflexible private trust re-
quirements” on the Commonwealth and found the majority’s inter-
pretation of the ERA to be “unmoored” from the ERA’s text.155  His
analysis was based upon finding that the ERA’s trust provisions do
not impose private trust principles or discuss financial proceeds.156
149. Id. at 937-39 (examining Sections 1602-E and 1603-E’s constitutionality).
For further discussion of what Sections 1602-E and 1603-E govern, see supra note
36 and accompanying text.
150. PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 937-39 (emphasizing trust’s purpose and how trust
assets may be utilized).
151. Id. at 939 (describing government’s violation of ERA).  The court rea-
soned that the government did not violate the ERA because it diverted funds from
the Lease Fund; instead, the government violated the ERA when the fund’s diver-
sion was for non-trust purposes. Id.
152. Id. at 938-39 (stating Sections 1602-E and 1603-E are unconstitutional).
The court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s holding that the fund appropria-
tions were proper because there was no constitutional mandate to reinvest the
lease funds for solely conservation purposes. Id.
153. Id. at 940 (Baer, J., concurring) (stating Justice Baer’s concurrence with
overturning Payne and declaring ERA to be self-executing).
154. Id. (Baer, J., dissenting) (stating Justice Baer’s dissent from majority find-
ing Sections 1602-E and 1603-E to be unconstitutional).  Justice Baer did not agree
with the majority that the lease sale revenues are part of the trust’s corpus. Id.
155. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 940
(Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (finding majority’s reading of ERA to be errone-
ous and lacked attention to ERA’s text).
156. Id. (laying out Justice Baer’s reasoning for his disagreement from major-
ity opinion).  Justice Baer looked to the ERA’s purpose and legislative history to
determine that the ERA was meant to govern natural resources, not the lease sale
revenues. Id.  Justice Baer reiterated that the ERA’s purpose was only to prevent
further pollution and wasting of public natural resources. Id.  Further, Justice Baer
reasoned that the legislature did not consider financial proceeds when passing the
ERA. Id.
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Justice Baer began his analysis by looking at the common law
public trust doctrine, which aimed to limit the state’s usage of trust
property and allowed funds to be used for the general public’s ben-
efit.157  Justice Baer concluded that the lease sale revenues could be
used for public needs beyond conservation purposes because the
ERA created a public, not private, trust.158  Next, Justice Baer ar-
gued that the Commonwealth’s duty was to conserve public natural
resources, regardless of the state’s financial position.159  Despite the
Commonwealth’s obligation to fund resource conservation, Justice
Baer argued that the Commonwealth is not barred under the ERA
from using excess lease sale revenues for the “public’s health,
safety, and welfare.”160
Lastly, Justice Baer criticized the majority’s opinion that lease
sale revenues are considered part of the trust’s corpus.161  He ar-
gued that the ERA did not refer to or imply that the lease sale reve-
nues should be part of the trust’s corpus.162  To support his
position, Justice Baer observed that the ERA did not refer to citi-
zens as “beneficiaries,” or define public natural resources as part of
the trust’s corpus.163  Instead, Justice Baer argued that the majority
isolates millions of dollars of revenue from resource extraction for
only conservation purposes without considering what funding is
necessary for the public.164  In conclusion, Justice Baer believed the
157. Id. at 943 (summarizing how public trust law was first interpreted).  Jus-
tice Baer stated that public trust law had originally be applied to state lands and
later extended to natural resources when the ERA was enacted. Id.
158. Id. at 944 (declaring lease sale revenues can be used for more than just
trust purposes).
159. Id. at 944-45 (determining Commonwealth’s duty under ERA).  Justice
Baer noted that the word “conserve” required prudent use of public natural re-
sources. Id. at 947.  To illustrate what “conserve” means, Justice Baer used an exam-
ple of the government telling citizens to conserve water during a drought. Id.  In
this example, the public may still use the water for necessary needs but should not
waste the water. Id.  Justice Baer analogized this to the Commonwealth using the
lease sale revenues for conservation purposes and should not waste the leftover
revenues by restricting them from being used for other general needs. Id.
160. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 948
(Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (explaining ERA created public trust, not private
trust, and proceeds from lease sales may be used for other public needs).
161. Id. (detailing reasons for lease sale revenues not being part of trust’s
corpus).
162. Id. at 946 (showing ERA does not support majority’s determination that
lease sale revenues are part of trust’s corpus).
163. Id. at 942 (detailing lack of private trust terms in ERA’s text).
164. Id. at 941 (stating negative impact from majority’s decision).  Justice
Baer argued that the majority’s opinion threatens the government’s branches from
achieving a “constitutionally-mandated” state budget. Id. at 940-41.
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majority should have imposed public, not private, trust principles
when interpreting the ERA.165
V. IN PUBLIC WE TRUST: PUBLIC TRUST LAW FURTHERS THE
INTENTION OF THE ERA
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in PEDF III rep-
resents a monumental decision in Pennsylvania’s environmental
law.166  The decision drills in place the ERA’s text as the proper
standard of review for environmental challenges.167  In doing so,
the court made two significant statements: (1) the Payne test is over-
turned, and (2) private trust law governs the Commonwealth’s du-
ties under the ERA.168  The court’s decision to reject the three-
prong Payne test bolstered the court’s prior decision in Robinson
Township, which was seen as beginning the restoration of the ERA’s
original meaning.169  It is unclear, however, how the new standard
of review applies to other circumstances outside of those in PEDF
III.170  The court also, for the first time, applied private trust princi-
ples to limit the way the Commonwealth manages its public natural
resources.171  Whether these two changes were for the benefit of
the Commonwealth’s citizens remains unsettled.172
165. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 911, 941
(Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (concluding principles from public trust doctrine
should have been applied to ERA’s text).  Justice Baer would have affirmed the
Commonwealth Court’s partial summary relief for the Commonwealth and deny
relief to the PEDF. Id.  Justice Baer does not believe the PEDF met its burden of
proof to show the statutes “clearly, palpably, and plainly violate[d] the Constitu-
tion.” Id.  Chief Justice Saylor also dissented and agreed with Justice Baer’s analysis
that the ERA is “an embodiment of the public trust doctrine.” Id. at 949 (Saylor, J.,
dissenting).
166. See Bossert, supra note 102 (highlighting significance of PEDF’s
decision).
167. See Phillips, supra note 52 (stating accomplishments associated with
PEDF’s decision for environmental challenges).
168. For further discussion of the Court’s reasoning in overturning Payne, see
supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the Court’s
analysis for imposing private trust law, see supra notes 136-140 and accompanying
text.
169. See Soreth, supra note 10, at 351 (affirming Robinson Township decision to
reject three-prong Payne test); see also Steven T. Miano & Jessica R. O’Neill, supra
note 108, at 1 (explaining ERA’s original intent was restored).
170. For further discussion of the questions PEDF III’s standard of review will
raise, see infra notes 176-184 and accompanying text.
171. For further discussion of the majority’s limitation on the Common-
wealth’s abilities to use lease sale revenues, see infra notes 195-196 and accompany-
ing text.
172. See Bossert, supra note 102 (describing uncertainty created by court’s
new standard of review and imposition of private trust principles).
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A. The Court Plowed Over Payne, but What Surfaced Next is
Unclear
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision to overturn the
Payne test created landmark precedent that the ERA’s text is now
unquestionably the “law of the land in Pennsylvania” for environ-
mental challenges.173  The court consistently followed the trend
started in Robinson Township, which looked to the ERA’s text in ana-
lyzing the challenged legislative enactments.174  The new standard
adopted in PEDF III requires claims to be assessed in accordance
with the ERA’s text and the underlying principles of private trust
law.175  Although this standard of review worked well for the issues
in PEDF III, it is unclear how the standard will apply in other
circumstances.176
The decision in PEDF III dealt solely with public natural re-
sources.177  The court suggested that “public natural resources”
might encompass privately owned resources that “involve a public
interest.”178  The court did not, however, provide guidance on how
the new standard would apply to government actions on private
lands.179  The PEDF III circumstances were unique because PEDF
challenged Fiscal Code provisions that appropriated revenues from
the Lease Fund to the General Fund.180  The new standard of re-
view was appropriate in PEDF III because the court was analyzing
the Commonwealth’s duties under the trust provisions of the ERA’s
second and third clauses.181  The first clause of the ERA, however,
was not implicated by the facts of PEDF III.182  As a result, the court
173. McKinstry & Weiss, supra note 73 (finding ERA’s text to be governing
standard for environmental challenges); see also Phillips, supra note 52 (stating Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania rejected over forty years of precedent by overturning
Payne).
174. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 916,
930 (Pa. 2017) (describing Payne as inappropriate standard of review for examin-
ing ERA challenges and shifted towards looking at ERA’s text).
175. See id. (describing proper standard of review for challenges under ERA).
176. See Bossert, supra note 102 (noting it is unclear how court’s standard of
review will apply to other circumstances).
177. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 916 (finding oil and gas to be public natural
resource and revenues generated from their extraction are part of trust’s corpus).
178. See id. at 949 n.22 (noting private property may have been included in
court’s standard of review under ERA).
179. See McKinstry & Weiss, supra note 73 (discussing possible limits to PEDF
III’s standard of review).
180. For further discussion of PEDF III’s factual summary, see supra notes 33-
54 and accompanying text.
181. See Bossert, supra note 102 (noting court’s standard of review was well
suited for issues in PEDF III).
182. See id. (observing first clause of ERA did not pertain to PEDF III’s facts).
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failed to address how the new standard of review would apply to the
ERA’s first clause, even though most claims brought under the ERA
are for a violation of the first clause.183  Although the breadth of
the new standard’s application remains unclear, the standard will
undoubtedly be applied to government and private actions that in-
fringe on citizens’ environmental rights and courts will be left
guessing as how to apply the PEDF III decision.184
B. Trust the Dissent: The Majority’s Broad Interpretation of
ERA’s Trust Provisions Narrow the Process to Allocate Funds
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unprecedentedly used pri-
vate trust principles to broadly interpret the ERA’s public trust
clauses.185  The court asserts private trust law by describing the
trust’s corpus, which is owned by the beneficiaries and managed by
a trustee, as being used only for conservation purposes.186  Accord-
ing to the court’s findings, private trust law was unambiguously im-
plicated in its decision because the trust’s assets were to be used for
a specific purpose.187  The court’s imposition of private trust princi-
ples, however, is inconsistent and an overreach of the ERA’s text.188
The ERA’s text does not refer to the citizens as beneficiaries or pub-
lic natural resources as the “corpus of trust.”189  Instead, the ERA
seems to invoke public trust principles, and Justice Baer in his dis-
sent, accurately notes this observation.190
183. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating ERA’s first clause gives citizens right to
clean air and pure water); see also Bossert, supra note 102 (noting it is uncertain
whether Commonwealth is also trustee for air, land, and water).
184. See Hill, supra note 120 (discussing recommendations for government
and private parties to obtain approval for their environmental projects); see also
Ctr. for Coalfield Justice v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Nos. 2014-072-B, 2014-083-B, 2015-
051-B, 2017 WL 3842580, at *31 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Aug. 15, 2017) (noting
PEDF III decision does not translate well to more typical types of cases that come
before Environmental Hearing Board).  In Center for Coalfield Justice, the citizens
were challenging a government agency’s decision. Id.
185. See Holtzman, supra note 122 (describing court’s novel interpretation of
ERA’s trust provisions).
186. See Dernbach, supra note 3, at 472-73 (explaining private trust law princi-
ples and describing trust’s purpose is to conserve public natural resources).
187. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 916,
934-35 (Pa. 2017) (finding specific terms of ERA’s trust provisions to require lease
sale revenues to be used only for conservation purposes).
188. See id. at 940 (Baer, J., dissenting) (stating private trust principles are
absent from ERA’s text).
189. See id. at 942 (explaining ERA broadly provides for public natural re-
sources to be people’s common property).
190. See id. at 941 (asserting public trust doctrine requires Commonwealth to
manage citizens’ property for public’s benefit).
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Public trust principles are centered on benefitting the pub-
lic.191  The legislature expanded the doctrine to encompass public
natural resources, and encouraged governments to use any revenue
gained from the resources to enhance the general public.192  Justice
Baer properly asserted that the ERA required the Commonwealth
to use the revenues, not only for conversation purposes, but also for
pressing needs that are necessary to benefit citizens and future gen-
erations.193  The ERA’s purpose, to benefit the general public, di-
rectly aligns with Justice Baer’s conclusion that the lease sale
revenues may be used for other public needs.194  The majority’s de-
cision to restrict the use of revenues for only conservation purposes,
however, cannot fully benefit the people when there are other
needs such as health, safety, and welfare that are also necessary for
the public’s benefit.195
The majority’s decision eliminates any use of the lease sale rev-
enues, for purposes other than resource conservation, regardless of
the positive impact on the general welfare.196  The drafters of the
ERA did not intend for such a narrow interpretation of the trust
corpus’s usage.197  While the majority’s narrow interpretation prop-
erly restricts the Commonwealth’s power to act contrary to the citi-
191. See id. at 943 (discussing history of public trust doctrine).  The public
trust doctrine focuses on preserving the environment for the public’s enjoyment
and benefit. Id.
192. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF III), 161 A.3d 916,
943-44 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (noting public trust doctrine’s applicabil-
ity).  The doctrine originally applied to waterways and parkland and expanded to
encompass public natural resources after the ERA was enacted in 1971. Id. at 943.
193. See id. at 944-45 (finding ERA intended lease sale revenues to be used to
benefit all public, not just specifically conservation purposes).  Once the Common-
wealth has fulfilled its conservation duties, it is illogical to leave the revenues un-
used when there are other pressing needs the revenues could be used for. Id. at
945.
194. See Phillips, supra note 52 (describing court imposed limitations on Com-
monwealth’s trustee abilities).
195. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 945 (Baer, J., dissenting) (explaining majority’s
interpretation of ERA does not fully benefit general public).  Justice Baer de-
scribed the majority’s decision as “redrafting the Constitution to its own liking,
ignoring the public trust doctrine, and usurping the appropriate role of the legisla-
ture.” Id. at 948.
196. See Pennsylvania Supreme Court Invalidates Test for Constitutionality of Com-
monwealth Environmental Actions and Applies Private Trust Law, Leaving Many Unan-
swered Questions, FROST, TODD, BROWN, LLP (June 23, 2017), http://www.frost
browntodd.com/resources-pennsylvania-supreme-court-invalidates-test-for-constitu
tionality-of-commonwealth-environmental-actions.html (noting there is uncer-
tainty regarding whether lease sale revenues can be used for schools, infrastruc-
ture, or pension relief).
197. See PEDF III, 161 A.3d at 944-45 (Baer, J., dissenting) (explaining ERA
does not mention any specific financial constraint).
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zens’ environmental rights, its broad interpretation illustrates a lack
of literal construal of the ERA’s text.198
VI. TO BE CONTINUED: LOWER COURTS ARE LEFT FILLING IN
THE MAJORITY’S HOLES
Many commentators regard the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania’s decision in PEDF III as a paramount win for environmen-
talists.199  Under the new standard of review for claims rooted in the
ERA, it is expected that environmental challenges will now be re-
solved in favor of protecting citizens’ environmental rights.200
Roughly a month after the court decided PEDF III, the Environmen-
tal Hearing Board struck down a government agency’s permit revi-
sion for “longwall mining” as being in violation of the ERA in Center
for Coalfield Justice and Sierra Club v. DEP.201  The Center for Coalfield
Justice decision has begun the trend towards impeding government
actions that infringe on citizens’ environmental rights.202
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s new standard puts gov-
ernment actions under heightened scrutiny, which creates a poten-
tial slippery slope for finding too many future government actions
as affecting citizens’ environmental rights and thus, violating the
ERA.203  Challengers to government actions will be eager to use the
PEDF III decision to postpone or prevent various environmental
projects.204  The likely spike in striking down government actions
198. See McKinstry & Weiss, supra note 73 (summarizing positive effects of
PEDF III opinion as well as some criticisms).
199. See generally Phillips, supra note 52 (regarding court’s decision as “big
win” for environmental advocates).  In regards to the PEDF III decision, a commen-
tator stated “this is a huge step forward for the rights of the people of Pennsylvania
to a healthy environment.” Id.
200. See id. (noting stricter duties imposed on Commonwealth when dealing
with Pennsylvania’s natural resources).  An environmental attorney stated that the
“Commonwealth can no longer treat our natural resources as government prop-
erty.” Id.  For further discussion of Commonwealth’s duties as a trustee, see supra
note 137 and accompanying text.
201. See Ctr. for Coalfield Justice & Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. and
Consol. Pa. Coal Co., Nos. 2014-072-B, 2014-083-B, 2015-051-B, 2017 WL 3842580,
at *37 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Aug. 15, 2017) (summarizing part of Environmental
Hearing Board’s holding).  The Board found permit revision No. 189 to have vio-
lated the ERA because the Department did not act according to their trustee du-
ties and violated the citizens’ right to pure water. Id.
202. See id. (finding government agency’s permit revision violated ERA); see
also Hill, supra note 120 (discussing cases that challenged government actions that
are currently being reviewed by lower courts).
203. See Hill, supra note 120 (noting court’s new standard of review for chal-
lenges under ERA imposes stricter scrutiny on government actions).
204. See id. (describing how environmentalists may use PEDF III decision to
their advantage).
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for implicating citizens’ environmental rights could mirror the det-
rimental effects of the highly criticized Payne test.205  Plaintiffs who
attempted to enforce their environmental rights rarely won under
the narrow Payne test.206  Now, due to the standard in PEDF III, it is
likely that plaintiffs may predominantly win and the government’s
environmental actions will likely be struck down.207  In addition,
the heightened scrutiny for government actions under the new
standard of review will inhibit, or at a minimum, slow down the
process for environmentally impactful projects.208
Although protecting citizens’ environmental rights under the
ERA is crucial, it is also necessary to find the proper balance be-
tween conserving the environment and benefitting the general pub-
lic’s needs.209  As a result of the majority’s imposition of private
trust law in the PEDF III decision, leftover revenues in the Lease
Fund are prohibited from being used for purposes other than to
conserve Pennsylvania’s natural resources.210  This holds substantial
weight because millions of dollars from lease sales are fenced off
from the government for any other public needs.211  Now that the
PEDF III decision prohibits the lease sale revenues from being
shared, other public needs will likely feel the effects of losing the
additional funding.212
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s monumental decision
changed over four decades of Pennsylvania’s environmental law
precedent.213  In comparison to where it began over forty years ago
205. For further discussion of the Payne test’s criticisms, see supra notes 102-
106 and accompanying text.
206. For further discussion of the difficulties faced by plaintiffs to enforce
their environmental rights under the Payne test, see supra note 91 and accompany-
ing text.
207. See Bossert, supra note 102 (noting PEDF III’s decision will enforce and
uphold citizens’ environmental rights).
208. See Hill, supra note 120 (discussing negative effects PEDF III standard
could have on environmental projects).
209. For further discussion of the argument that revenues in the Lease Fund
should be used for purposes other than solely conservation, see supra notes 158-
164 and accompanying text.
210. For further discussion of the court’s reason for strictly using the lease
sale revenues for conservation purposes, see supra notes 138-140 and accompany-
ing text.
211. For further discussion of the result from the court prohibiting the lease
sale revenues to be used for purposes other than conservation, see supra note 164
and accompanying text.
212. For further discussion of Pennsylvania’s budgetary shortfalls and how the
government tried to make up for the shortage, see supra notes 35-38 and accompa-
nying text.
213. For further discussion of PEDF III’s significance in environmental law,
see supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
29
Cabrera: Trust the Process? The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's Broad Inte
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
258 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX: p. 229
with the Payne test, the court is taking strides in the right direction
towards protecting citizens’ environmental rights.214  The process
to determine how the new standard of review applies to circum-
stances outside of PEDF III, however, will be ongoing.215  The court
has left questions unanswered that will undoubtedly result in litiga-
tion and allow for lower courts to grapple with the interpretation of
the standard’s applicability.216
Rebecca A. Cabrera*
214. For further discussion of the citizens’ rights under the ERA’s new stan-
dard, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the
detrimental effects of the Payne test for citizens who were trying to enforce their
environmental rights, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
215. For further discussion of what circumstances were not considered in
PEDF III’s decision, see supra notes 176-184 and accompanying text.
216. For further discussion of the unanswered questions in PEDF III, see supra
note 183-184 and accompanying text.
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